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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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________________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge 
 In November of 2011 Sheldon Mann, a football 
player for the Palmerton Area School District, experienced a 
hard hit during a practice session.  While some players thought 
that Sheldon may have been exhibiting concussion-like 
symptoms, he was sent back into the practice session by his 
Coach, Appellee Chris Walkowiak.  After being returned to 
practice, Sheldon suffered another violent collision and was 
removed from the practice field.  He would later be diagnosed 
with a traumatic brain injury.  In bringing a lawsuit against 
Palmerton Area and Walkowiak, Sheldon’s parents asserted 
that by requiring Sheldon to continue to practice after 
sustaining the first substantial blow, Walkowiak had violated 
Sheldon’s constitutional right to bodily integrity under a state-
created danger theory of liability.  Also, Palmerton Area, the 
Manns alleged, was accountable under Monell v. Department 
of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  
The District Court ruled in favor of Walkowiak and Palmerton 
Area on summary judgment, finding that, while there was 
ample evidence to suggest that Walkowiak was culpable under 
a state-created danger theory of liability, a constitutional right 
to protection in the context presented here was not clearly 
established in 2011.  Accordingly, the District Court granted 
Walkowiak qualified immunity and dismissed him from the 
lawsuit on that basis.  As to Palmerton Area, the District Court 
found that the Manns had failed to present evidence sufficient 
to warrant a jury trial on the question of whether the school 
district had a custom or policy that caused a violation of 
Sheldon’s constitutional rights.  Accordingly, the District 
Court entered judgment in favor of Palmerton Area.  
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 We agree with the District Court’s conclusions 
pertaining to the claims against the football coach:  
Walkowiak’s alleged conduct, if proven at trial, would be 
sufficient to support a jury verdict in favor of Mann on his 
state-created danger claim, but the right in question—to be free 
from deliberate exposure to a traumatic brain injury after 
exhibiting signs of a concussion in the context of a violent 
contact sport—was not clearly established in 2011.  
Accordingly, the District Court correctly ruled that Coach 
Walkowiak was entitled to qualified immunity.  We also agree 
with the District Court that the Manns did not present sufficient 
evidence to warrant a jury trial on the Monell claim against 
Palmerton Area.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment.    
I. 
 Sheldon Mann was a student at Palmerton Area High 
School and had participated in its football program starting in 
July of 2008.  Beginning in 2006, Walkowiak was a team coach 
and in 2011 was promoted to Head Coach.  After being named 
Head Coach, Walkowiak received concussion and safety 
training at DeSales University.  Because of this training he was 
aware of the signs and symptoms of a concussion.  
 On November 1, 2011, Sheldon, then a 17 year-old 
senior, was participating in practice and sustained a hard hit to 
his upper body area while playing the outside linebacker 
position as part of the “scout” team against the varsity starting 
team.1  Walkowiak claims he did not see the hit, but did 
                                              
1  The role of a “scout” team in football practice is to play the 
role of the opposing team for the school’s next game, with the 
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observed Sheldon “rolling” his shoulder.  (JA 509.)  
Walkowiak testified at his deposition that he asked Sheldon if 
“he was all right,” to which Sheldon replied, “I’m fine,” and 
Sheldon continued to participate in the practice session.2  (Id.)   
                                              
starting team running plays against anticipated formation of the 
opposing team.  In this case, Sheldon was playing against the 
Palmerton Area’s starting offensive team as they prepared for 
their upcoming game against Northern Lehigh High School.  
 
2  Walkowiak indicated that the first hit may have produced 
something like a shoulder “stinger,” which he acknowledged 
can be “a symptom of [a concussion], depending on where you 
were hit.”  (JA 1592, 1599).  According to the University of 
Rochester Medical Center online “Health Encyclopedia:” 
 
Stingers occur when the shoulder and head go in 
opposite directions, the head is moved quickly to 
one side, or the area above the collarbone is hit. 
The injury occurs when a spinal nerve in the neck 
is compressed as the head accelerates backward 
and the neck is forced toward the affected side. 
Stingers may also be caused when the head 
accelerates sideways, away from the shoulder, 
which overstretches the nerves in the neck and 
shoulder region.  
 
University of Rochester Medical Center, Health Encyclopedia, 
Put a Stop to Nerve Injuries Called Stingers (2017), 
https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/encyclopedia/content.aspx?c
ontenttypeid=1&contentid=2817 (last visited Aug. 24, 2017). 
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 In multiple depositions, Sheldon’s teammates 
testified that they believed Sheldon was suffering from a 
concussion after this hit and were surprised that he was allowed 
to continue to practice.  One teammate even testified that it was 
one of the “bigger hits” he had ever seen.  (JA 1657.)  Another 
teammate testified that after the first hit, Sheldon looked as 
though he was dizzy and was stumbling around the field, 
symptoms that this teammate believed to be associated with a 
concussion.   And while not explicitly stating that they believed 
that Sheldon Mann was suffering from a concussion, other 
coaches testified that they were aware of the symptoms of a 
concussion and that standard procedure was to remove a 
student suffering from concussion-like symptoms from 
practice and have him seen by a trainer.     
 Approximately twenty plays after Walkowiak 
observed Sheldon rolling his shoulder, Sheldon sustained a 
second hard hit to the upper body area.  Walkowiak walked 
over to Sheldon to ascertain his condition.  Sheldon told 
Walkowiak that “it was the hardest hit he received in playing 
football.”  (JA 550).  After this second hit, Sheldon was 
removed from the practice field.  Practice ended about 10 
minutes later, and Walkowiak then accompanied Sheldon to 
the trainer’s room.   
 At the time of this incident, Palmerton Area had in 
place a series of policies and procedures outlined in its 2011-
2012 Athletic Handbook.  The Handbook required that any 
player suffering from injury or illness be excluded from 
participation in the sport until cleared by a physician, and 
explicitly stated that a student suspected to be injured must be 
removed from play and sent to the athletic trainer.     
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 As a result of the violent hits Sheldon sustained on 
November 1, 2011, he suffered a traumatic brain injury and his 
parents have been appointed his guardians.  The Manns 
brought this lawsuit, asserting that Palmerton Area and 
Walkowiak (together “Appellees”) had deprived Sheldon of 
this constitutionally-protected right to bodily integrity.  
Specifically, they argued that Sheldon’s constitutional rights 
were violated as a result of Walkowiak’s exercise of authority 
in telling Sheldon to continue participating in football practice 
after sustaining a hit and exhibiting signs of a concussion.  
Plaintiffs also claimed that Sheldon’s constitutional rights were 
violated as a result of Palmerton Area’s failure to assure that 
injured student-athletes were medically cleared to resume 
participation in the sport, failure to enforce and enact proper 
concussion policies, and failure to train the coaches on a safety 
protocol for head injuries.  The parties engaged in discovery, 
and on February 1, 2016, Appellees moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to 
establish a state-created danger claim against Walkowiak and 
a municipal liability claim against Palmerton Area.  
Walkowiak also asserted a right to qualified immunity.  On 
June 2, 2016, the District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of defendants Walkowiak and Palmerton Area.  This 
appeal followed. 
II. 
 The District Court possessed subject–matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343.  We 
exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1291.  Our review of an order granting summary judgment is 
plenary.  Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Wright v. 
Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Orsatti v. 
N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)).   
III. 
 State actors sued in their individual capacity under 
Section 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity “insofar as 
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  
When a qualified immunity defense is asserted, a court must 
determine (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff make 
out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that 
right was clearly established at the time of the injury.  Yarris v. 
Cty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal 
citation omitted).  In this case, the District Court determined 
that the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry was 
satisfied: the Manns had presented sufficient evidence to 
warrant a jury trial on the question of whether Walkowiak had 
violated Sheldon’s constitutional rights.  It is to this part of the 
qualified immunity test that we first turn our attention. 
A. 
 The Manns’ state-created danger claim derives from 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, which 
provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law[.]”  U.S. Const. 
amend XIV, § 1.  We have recognized a successful state-
created danger claim when a plaintiff pleads that   
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(1) the harm ultimately caused [by the state 
actor’s conduct] was foreseeable and fairly 
direct; (2) a state actor acted with a degree of 
culpability that shocks the conscience; (3) a 
relationship between the state and the plaintiff 
existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable 
victim of the defendant's acts, or a member of a 
discrete class of persons subjected to the 
potential harm brought about by the state's 
actions, as opposed to a member of the public in 
general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used 
his or her authority in a way that created a danger 
to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more 
vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted 
at all. 
Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted).   
 The first element of a state-created danger claim 
requires plaintiffs to establish that the harm sustained as a 
result of the defendant’s conduct was “foreseeable and fairly 
direct.”  Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  More specifically, this “require[s] a plaintiff to 
allege an awareness on the part of the state actors that rises to 
[the] level of actual knowledge or an awareness of risk that is 
sufficiently concrete to put the actors on notice of the harm.”  
Id. at 238.   
 In his deposition, Walkowiak testified that he was 
aware of the symptoms of a concussion and had been trained 
in how to identify one.  Walkowiak also testified that he was 
trained to err on the side of caution when it came to removing 
players who may be suffering concussion-like symptoms.  
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After Sheldon experienced the first hit, Walkowiak admitted 
that Sheldon’s hit could have been characterized as a “stinger” 
and that this could be a symptom of a concussion.  (JA 1592; 
1599). 
 The District Court held that this evidence would be 
sufficient to support a jury finding that “Sheldon’s injury was 
a ‘foreseeable and fairly direct’ harm” of being allowed to 
continue to practice after sustaining the first big hit.  Mann v. 
Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 189 F. Supp. 3d 467, 475 (M.D. Pa. 
2016).  We agree. 
 The District Court also held that the Manns had 
satisfied the second element of the state-created danger test—
that Walkowiak acted with a degree of culpability that shocked 
the conscience.  We have observed that “[t]he exact degree of 
wrongfulness necessary to reach the ‘conscience-shocking’ 
level depends upon the circumstances of a particular case.”  
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 153 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d 
Cir. 1999)).  If the circumstances are highly pressurized, it is 
necessary to show intentional harm by the state actor; however, 
if the state actor has the benefit of deliberation, then all the 
plaintiff needs to show is deliberate indifference.  Id.  
Moreover, in cases “involving something less urgent than a 
‘split-second’ decision but more urgent than an ‘unhurried 
judgment,’” the relevant inquiry is whether the state actor 
“consciously disregarded a great risk of harm,” with the 
possibility that “actual knowledge of the risk may not be 
necessary where the risk is ‘obvious.’”  Sanford v. Stiles, 456 
F.3d 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 The District Court correctly concluded that there was 
no indication that this was a highly pressurized environment 
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for which a showing of intent to harm would be necessary.  
Instead, the Manns only needed to prove deliberate 
indifference to the safety of a player in the circumstances 
presented here to satisfy the conscience-shocking element of 
their claim.  (JA 12).   
 In Walkowiak’s deposition testimony, he stated that 
he observed Sheldon as exhibiting the signs of a possible 
“stinger,” a term that he acknowledged is associated with a 
concussion.  He also testified, however, that he assumed the hit 
was not a substantial one because he did not actually see it.  
Contradicting Walkowiak’s testimony is the testimony of an 
assistant coach, who, although absent from practice the day 
that Sheldon was injured, stated that Walkowiak told him that 
Sheldon experienced two hard hits.  Walkowiak’s boss, 
Athletic Director Andrew Remsing, also testified that 
Walkowiak could be considered to have failed to follow school 
policy for injuries by allowing Sheldon to remain if he was 
suffering concussive symptoms.  Finally, the Manns presented 
testimony through other players that after Sheldon was first hit, 
Walkowiak instructed him to continue practicing.  Although 
Walkowiak disclaimed knowledge of the first big hit, the 
Manns adduced sufficient evidence to call this disclaimer into 
doubt.  Thus, for the purposes of the summary judgment ruling, 
it was appropriate to infer that that Walkowiak was aware that 
Sheldon had sustained a substantial blow and exhibited signs 
consistent with having sustained a concussion.  Under these 
circumstances, a jury could find that, by failing to remove 
Sheldon from play and requiring him to continue to practice, 
Walkowiak was deliberately indifferent to the risk posed by 
sustaining a second substantial blow to the head.   
 To establish the third element of a state-created 
danger claim the Manns were required to prove that “a 
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relationship between the state and [Sheldon] existed such that 
[Sheldon] was a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts.”  
Sanford, 456 F.3d at 304.  This element was not challenged by 
Appellees.  The bar for proving this element is not terribly 
high, as we have previously held that a relationship can exist 
where a plaintiff is a member of a group that is subject to 
potential harm brought about by the state’s actions.  Philips v. 
Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 242 (3d Cir. 2008).  It is clear 
that a student-athlete stands in such a relationship with the 
coaching staff. 
 The final element of a state-created danger claim 
requires a showing that Walkowiak affirmatively used his 
authority in a way that created a danger to Sheldon or rendered 
him more vulnerable to danger.  Bright, 443 F.3d at 281.  The 
parties dispute whether Walkowiak took an affirmative act that 
put Sheldon in danger or made him more vulnerable to risk, but 
we find the District Court again to be correct in assessing that 
a reasonable juror could find this element of Sheldon’s claim 
was also satisfied.  If a jury concluded that Walkowiak was 
aware of the first blow to Sheldon’s head and observed signs 
of a concussion, the jury could conclude that Walkowiak used 
his authority in a way that rendered Sheldon more vulnerable 
to harm by sending him back into the practice session. 
 In summary, we hold that there exists a relationship 
between a student-athlete and coach at a state-sponsored 
school such that the coach may be held liable where the coach 
requires a player, showing signs of a concussion, to continue 
to be exposed to violent hits.  Stated otherwise, we hold that an 
injured student-athlete participating in a contact sport has a 
constitutional right to be protected from further harm, and that 
a state actor violates this right when the injured student-athlete 
is required to be exposed to a risk of harm by continuing to 
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practice or compete.  We now turn to the difficult question of 
whether this right was clearly established in November of 
2011. 
B. 
 Clearly established law for purposes of qualified 
immunity means that  
[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently 
clear that a reasonable official would understand 
that what he is doing violates that right.  This is 
not to say that an official action is protected by 
qualified immunity unless the very action in 
question has previously been held unlawful, but 
it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the 
unlawfulness must be apparent. 
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999).  In addressing the 
clearly established prong of the qualified immunity inquiry, we 
must define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level 
of specificity.  Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 
2012) (internal quotations omitted).  As we explained in Spady 
v. Bethlehem Area School District, 800 F.3d 633, 638 (3d Cir. 
2015), we must “frame the right at issue in a more 
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense, in light of the 
case’s specific context, not as a broad general proposition.” 
(Internal quotations omitted.)  
 In Spady, a child suffered “dry drowning” after 
participating in a mandatory swim class run by the gym 
teacher.  Id. at 635.  We granted qualified immunity to the gym 
teacher, concluding that a child did not have a clearly 
established right to dry-drowning intervention protocols while 
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participating in gym class.  Id. at 641.  In arriving at this 
conclusion, we observed that the dangers of dry drowning were 
not so well known and obvious that a swim teacher should be 
expected to take extra precautions to guard against this rare 
phenomenon.  Id.   
 In this case, the specific context is a football player 
fully clothed in protective gear, including a helmet, who 
experiences a violent blow, shows signs of a concussion, and 
is required to continue to engage in the same activity that 
caused the first substantial hit.  We are aware of no appellate 
case decided prior to November of 2011 that held that a coach 
violates the student’s constitutional rights by requiring the 
student to continue to play in these circumstances.   
 Our conclusion in Spady rested on the fact that 
“courts that have found colorable constitutional violations in 
school-athletic settings did so where state actors engaged in 
patently egregious and intentional misconduct.”  800 F.3d at 
641.  Compare Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Educ. 
229 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a student 
athlete had made out “a violation of his right under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to be free from excessive corporal 
punishment,” after being hit with a blunt object by his coach) 
and Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 
252 (2d Cir. 2001) (no qualified immunity where gym teacher 
picked up a student by his throat and rammed his head into 
bleachers and a fuse box); with Davis v. Carter, 555 F.3d 979, 
984 (11th Cir. 2009) (no constitutional violation stemming 
from student-athlete's death after rigorous football practice).  
No case has been called to our attention where a state-created 
danger was established after a student-athlete was required to 
continue to compete after sustaining a substantial hit, the 
results of which were observed by the coach and could 
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potentially signal a head injury, yet where the student-athlete 
told the coach that he was fine to continue to play, all of which 
is the evidence in this case.  And while not binding, we 
similarly held as recently as 2013 in a non-precedential opinion 
that a cheerleader who suffered a serious injury due to a 
coach’s decision to try out a new stunt without proper 
protective matting in place, did not violate a clearly established 
right held by the athlete.  See Hinterberger v. Iroquois Sch. 
Dist., 548 F. App'x 50, 54 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 The Manns rely heavily on L.R. v. School District of 
Philadelphia, 836 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2016).  That case 
presented the question of whether a kindergarten teacher who 
released a student to a stranger who then sexually abused the 
child was entitled to qualified immunity.  Id. at 239-240.  We 
reasoned that the teacher was not entitled to qualified immunity 
because the right in question—“an individual’s right not to be 
removed from a safe environment and placed into one in which 
it is clear that harm is likely to occur, particularly when the 
individual may, due to youth or other factors, be especially 
vulnerable to the risk of harm”—was clearly established at the 
time of the incident.  Id. at 249.  The Manns maintain that this 
same right is at issue in the case at hand.  And while L.R. dealt 
with an incident that occurred in January of 2013, we relied on 
precedent that predated November of 2011.  Specifically, L.R. 
relied heavily on our 1996 decision in Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 
F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996), which involved a police officer 
abandoning a plainly inebriated woman on her walk home who 
then passed out and suffered a serious injury.  Id. at 1203.  
 Kneipp and L.R. are not dispositive here.  L.R. 
established liability based on the fact that the risk of harm to 
the child would be patently obvious to any adult in that 
situation.  Allowing a kindergartener to leave the classroom 
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with a stranger plainly exposed the vulnerable kindergartener 
to a substantial risk of grievous harm.  Similarly, Kneipp dealt 
with a similarly vulnerable woman who was so inebriated that 
she could not even stand or follow simple instructions.  Not 
only did the police officer detain her and send her male 
companion away, but the officer himself then abandoned her 
so that she had to walk home alone.  Id. at 1201-03.  Again, the 
risk of harm in abandoning someone who is clearly exhibiting 
signs of a physical impairment like severe inebriation 
demonstrates such deliberate indifference to the unsafe 
situation created by the state actor that imposing liability on the 
state actor is appropriate. 
 By way of contrast, in November of 2011 it was not 
so plainly obvious that that requiring a student-athlete, fully 
clothed in protective gear, to continue to participate in practice 
after sustaining a violent hit and exhibiting concussion 
symptoms implicated the student athlete’s constitutional 
rights.  The touchstone of qualified immunity analysis is 
whether there was “sufficient precedent at the time of action, 
factually similar to the plaintiff's allegations, to put [the] 
defendant on notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally 
prohibited.”  Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & 
Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 
McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2001)).  We 
look first to the Supreme Court’s cases.  Even if support is 
lacking there, a “robust consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority in the Court[s] of Appeals could clearly establish a 
right for purposes of qualified immunity.”  L.R., 836 F.3d at 
248 (quoting Mammaro, 814 F.3d at 169)).  Here, no case from 
this Court or any of our sister Courts of Appeals, let alone a 
Supreme Court case, has applied the principles we elucidated 
in L.R. and Kneipp to the school athletic context.  We therefore 
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agree with the District Court that the right at issue here was not 
clearly established in November of 2011. 
 “When properly applied, [qualified immunity] 
protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who 
knowingly violate the law.’”  Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 
731, 743 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 
(1986)).  Given the state of the law in 2011, it cannot be said 
that Walkowiak was “plainly incompetent” in sending Sheldon 
in to continue to practice after he saw Sheldon rolling his 
shoulder and being told by Sheldon, “I’m fine.”  (JA 509).  Nor 
is there any basis for concluding that he knowingly violated 
Sheldon’s constitutional rights.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the District Court’s qualified immunity ruling. 
IV. 
 Finally, we must address the Manns’ Monell claim 
against Palmerton Area.  Local governments, such as school 
districts, cannot be held liable under §1983 for the acts of their 
employees.  Instead, local governments may be found liable 
under §1983 for “their own illegal acts.”  Connick v. 
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011).  A municipality is liable 
under §1983 when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the 
municipality itself, through the implementation of a municipal 
policy or custom, causes a constitutional violation.   
 The Manns argue that coaches were not adequately 
trained on concussion recognition and protection, and had they 
been, Sheldon may not have suffered his severe injury.  
Specifically, they argue that the school's generic handbook for 
dealing with injured student-athletes failed to provide a 
protocol for dealing specifically with concussions.  They 
submit national news articles from 2011 that reported on the 
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risk of concussions in football as well as manuals from 
neighboring school districts that had implemented concussion 
policies as of November 2011.  They also rely on Thomas v. 
Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 2014), in 
which we assessed the significance of an expert’s report 
establishing the need for training corrections officers to 
address and avoid inmate–on–inmate violence.  We held that 
because the evidence showed that the municipality failed to 
train its employees to handle recurring acts of violence, the 
District Court should not have precluded the factual issues 
from going to a jury.  Id. at 225-26.  Unlike Thomas, the Manns 
cite no evidence that would suggest deliberate indifference to 
a pattern of recurring injuries.  See Berg v. County of 
Al1egheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Failure to . . . 
train municipal employees can ordinarily be considered 
deliberate indifference only where the failure has caused a 
pattern of violations”).  “Without notice that a course of 
training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can 
hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program 
that will cause violations of constitutional rights.”  Connick, 
563 U.S. at 62.   
 In this case there is no evidence of a pattern of 
recurring head injuries in the Palmerton Area football program.  
Nor is there evidence that Walkowiak or any other member of 
the coaching staff deliberately exposed injured players to the 
continuing risk of harm that playing football poses.  In the 
context of the Monell claim, it is also significant that the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly did not pass legislation that 
mandated training for coaches to prevent concussions until 
November 9, 2011, and the legislation did not even go into 
effect until July of 2012.  See Safety in Youth Sports Act, 24 
Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5321–5323.  Under these circumstances 
19 
 
there is no basis for concluding that a policy or custom of 
Palmerton Area or its failure to provide more intense 
concussion training to its coaches caused a violation of 
Sheldon’s constitutional rights.   
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the District 
Court’s order, entered June 2, 2016, granting summary 
judgment in favor of Walkowiak and Palmerton Area.  
